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In the famous words of Robert Schuman, Europe is not built at once or as a 
single whole, but on the basis of concrete achievements, creating first a 
solidarity of fact.1 Even if in the original Treaties the word 'solidarity' only 
occurred as an echo of the Schuman declaration, in recent years it has made a 
number of appearances in key constitutional documents of the EU. Art. 2 of 
the Treaty of European Union (hereafter TEU) lists solidarity as one of the 
prevailing values of the EU and Art. 3 TEU illustrates that the Union shall 
promote solidarity in three different ways: as solidarity between generations, 
as solidarity among Member States, and as solidarity and mutual respect 
among peoples. Even the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the main human 
rights instrument of the EU, lists solidarity among its foundations and 
dedicates its Title IV to this principle.  
EU law might not be agnostic to the concept of solidarity, nevertheless its 
practical implementation and Member States' motivations behind the 
concept still remain controversial. The academic debate on solidarity within 
the EU raises a number of salient questions. How is the notion of solidarity 
understood in the framework of the EU? What are the legal, political, 
economic, and moral limits of European solidarity? Floris de Witte's book 
'Justice in the EU. The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity' tackles these 
difficult questions from an innovative perspective. Instead of focussing on 
solidarity between Member States, the book explores the way in which 
European integration and EU law reshape the relationship between citizens. 
By understanding justice as a relational commitment between citizens that 
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1 'L'Europe ne se fait pas d'un coup ni dans une construction d'ensemble, mais par des réalisations 
concrètes créant d'abord une solidarité de fait.' 
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stand in a particular relationship to each other, de Witte interestingly 
introduces interpersonal claims of solidarity based on relational interactions 
as a useful method for capturing cosmopolitan dynamics within the 
structures of the nation state. This review analyses and critically assesses the 
main arguments put forward by de Witte, as they appear in the five chapters 
of the book. 
The first Chapter of the book introduces ways of thinking about social justice 
beyond the nation state. De Witte understands social justice as the 
availability of welfare entitlements and choices enabling individuals to live a 
'good life', meaning an autonomous and dignified life, in which each citizen 
can choose how to structure their priorities. This understanding of social 
justice presupposes significant and long-term processes of social and 
institutional structuring, such as an active civil society, public sphere, and 
avenues for participation and mediation of differentiated interests. Besides 
institutions, the pursuit of social justice needs moral sources captured under 
the term 'solidarity' in so far as they create a motive for individuals to share 
their resources with others in the same community. These preconditions for 
the achievement of social justice explain why the pursuit of justice has 
historically been tied to the spatial context of the nation state. 
Nevertheless, de Witte notes that the globalization of economic processes 
and the integration through law in the EU progressively lift boundaries in 
economic and social terms and thus dislocate the question of social justice 
from the institutional structure of the nation state. The emergence of mobile 
actors, who dispose of the legal right and the economic capacity to exit a 
certain polity, significantly decreases the capacity of the nation state to lock 
in actors and to extract from them resources needed for redistributive 
programmes. This gradual dissolution of the social question away from the 
nation state has sparked diverse concerns and opinions among scholars. De 
Witte identifies four normative claims that animate the current academic 
debate about social justice. For adherents of the neo-liberal project, the 
dissolution of the social question is to be applauded, since it protects 
individual freedom against state intervention. Others, such as Polanyi and 
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Streeck,2 see the separation between the social question and the 
transnational economy as problematic, because it deprives citizens of their 
political agency over the conditions of life, while cosmopolitans see it as a 
positive step towards a new, cosmopolitan type of society. Finally, scholars 
such as Habermas3 understand the inability of the nation state to engage with 
transnational dynamics as an opportunity to start building political structures 
beyond the nation state.  
De Witte provides a very balanced presentation of the four normative claims, 
although he does not engage in a detailed discussion about the political 
background or implications of each claim presented. In this way, he misses 
the opportunity to underline how the political and ideological identity of a 
state influences the model of social policy it adopts. Moreover, de Witte's 
own views on the preferred justice paradigm remain deeply submerged, even 
if the reader might have suspicions about where his sympathies lie. The fact 
that he does not clearly articulate which of the four different paradigms he 
endorses, affects the coherence of the arguments presented in the book, since 
the types of EU solidarity presented in the following chapters are not 
(anymore) assessed under the lens of the normative claims introduced in the 
beginning of the book. This creates the misleading impression that there is 
no link between the justice paradigm adopted by the EU and the 
redistributive outcomes of the types of solidarity that the EU applies in 
practice. 
In any case, as de Witte remarks, any modern conception of justice cannot 
function relying exclusively on processes within or beyond the nation state. 
But then the difficult question arises, how can we strengthen the nation 
state's capacity for redistribution, while promoting the capacity of actors to 
move between states and thereby overcome the moral arbitrariness of 
boundaries? De Witte's book focuses specifically on the conceptualisation of 
a new mode of social integration, which would serve to realise a type of social 
justice that reconciles this tension. He suggests the concept of reciprocity, 
understood in economic, social or political terms, as a starting point for 
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reintegrating cosmopolitan dynamics within the structure of the nation state 
in the pursuit of social justice. Unlike other authors, who understand 
reciprocity as obligations between states,4 de Witte articulates a concept of 
solidarity based on the associative and relational interactions between 
citizens. He very interestingly introduces interpersonal claims of solidarity 
based on relational dynamics as a useful method for the reconfiguration of 
justice on national level so as to take account of transnational relational 
commitments.  
This is followed in Chapter 2 by an analysis of the interaction between 
national conceptions of justice, which are primarily expressed through 
institutions of the welfare state and the process of European integration. 
Even though the Union's legislative competences in the social area have 
gradually increased over time, social policy still remains the 'stepchild' of 
European integration. De Witte claims that the refusal of Member States to 
transfer welfare competences to the Union goes back to the absence on the 
European level of two essential institutional preconditions: a functioning 
system of representative democracy and the capacity to generate a feeling of 
solidarity between citizens. Quoting the Lisbon ruling of the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, de Witte convincingly argues that the redistribution 
of welfare is premised on the individual's right to political self-determination, 
namely the possibility to translate through the democratic process normative 
preferences into social policy decisions. The absence of such democratic 
structures in the EU is related to the absence of a type of solidarity that is 
strong enough to sustain redistributive policies.  
Yet, as de Witte rightly notes, since the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, the 
EU has strongly engaged in redistribution practices through the introduction 
of new instruments of economic governance. By way of the excessive deficit 
procedure, the macro-economic imbalance procedure, the European 
Semester and its country-specific recommendations, the Commission gained 
significant influence in domestic budgetary structures and national welfare 
policies, typically pleading for a scaling back of expenditure and welfare 
benefits. Even though accurately describing these developments, the book 
does not exhaustively discuss this shift in the EU's role in welfare policy, 
which challenges many of the assumptions of European constitutional law. 
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More specifically, in order to legitimize the redistributive convergence 
programmes that the Members of the Eurozone have to undergo, the EU 
resorts to executive power and expertise as sources of legitimacy. This 
transfer of power from representative to executive institutions might 
normatively be undesirable, but could in practice legitimize redistributive 
practices or sustain commitments to solidarity in the EU. In this regard, it 
would be interesting for the reader to know, if at this point of integration 
history, the EU's orientation towards another type of legitimacy, based on 
executive power and expertise, could indeed be a valid way for the creation of 
bonds of solidarity between the Member States.  
Notwithstanding the fundamental limitations to the EU's capacity to 
contribute to the attainment of social justice, de Witte reminds us that the 
EU clearly possesses certain social policy competences and, as highlighted in 
the Lisbon ruling, it must even be social. Against this background, de Witte 
illustrates the ways in which the EU is better positioned than the Member 
States to tackle the deficiencies of a purely national understanding of justice 
and to accommodate the increasingly transboundary nature of migration 
flows, economic interactions, and legal integration. First, EU law extends the 
capacity of individual citizens to pursue their conception of 'the good life' 
beyond their own Member State through the right to free movement. 
Second, EU law protects the principle of equal citizenship by extending a 
right to non-discrimination on the basis of nationality to all EU citizens, who 
exercise their right to free movement. Third, the EU is sensitive to the ways 
in which its demands of justice affect domestic redistributive processes. As 
de Witte notes, the parasitical nature of the EU's claims of justice, meaning 
that the EU cannot sustain redistributive practices on its own, makes the 
actual availability of welfare structures in the nation state crucial. This 
analysis of de Witte is very illustrative, since it dissolves the apparent 
contradiction between the Member States' prerogative in the awarding of 
welfare benefits on the one hand, and the development of Europe's social 
dimension on the other. In other words, de Witte convincingly approaches 
the EU not as a source of a genuine and new transnational concept of justice, 
but rather as a remedy for a spatially limited, national understanding of 
justice, which cannot mitigate the externalities ensuing from the increased 
interdependence and the mobility of persons, capital, and labour. 
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Having presented the interconnected nature of national and supranational 
social justice, the book formulates a theory of transnational solidarity, which 
serves to integrate the Union's claims of freedom and equality beyond the 
state with the relational structures of justice on the national level. The norms 
of transnational solidarity that structure this type of reintegration are deeply 
engrained in EU law and, in particular, in its norms of free movement and 
non-discrimination law. The core part of the book is devoted to the analysis 
of three types of transnational solidarity that describe how associative 
connections between citizens across borders, which may take economic, 
social or political forms, are translated into specific rights and entitlements.  
The first type of transnational solidarity, presented in Chapter 3, is market 
solidarity, which serves to integrate the associative connections that emerge 
through economic interactions on the internal market within the domestic 
structures of the welfare state. Market solidarity suggests that economic 
interaction alone constitutes a motive for sharing resources between citizens. 
De Witte sees the incorporation of market solidarity into EU law, in the first 
place, in terms of extending the personal scope of welfare benefits to include 
non-national EU citizens that work in a host state. The book interestingly 
points out that the reason for the demand of equal treatment is not so much 
the specific financial contribution of the migrant to the host state's finances, 
but rather the migrant's general engagement with the economic life of the 
host state. The second way, in which market solidarity is displayed, is by the 
construction of rights and obligations that the collectivities of 'labour' and 
'capital' owe each other when acting transnationally. In this case, the EU 
hesitantly sets rules, which allow host Member States to insulate their own 
conceptions of fairness against the dynamics of the internal market. 
Nevertheless, in matters of minimum wage, posted workers, and the right to 
collective action, de Witte rightly notes that the CJEU liberated capital from 
national constraints imposed to protect labour. Given that in cases such as 
Laval,5 Viking,6 Rüffert,7 and Commission v. Luxembourg8 the Court imposed 
transnational limits on the national exercise of labour rights, it is 
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questionable why de Witte chooses to include this dimension of EU law 
under the concept of transnational solidarity. If market solidarity aims to 
ensure that transnational economic interactions in the workplace conform to 
an idea of justice, it seems that this case law of the CJEU worryingly hollows 
and destabilizes the very function of transnational market solidarity. Instead 
of insulating the norms of market solidarity on the national level against the 
dynamics of the internal market, the CJEU introduces additional, 
transnational limits on the enjoyment of rights derived from market 
solidarity. 
The book presents the area of healthcare as the third way in which market 
solidarity manifests itself in EU law. In this case, free movement law has been 
interpreted so as to allow patients to enforce the conditions of the healthcare 
contract that they have entered into in their Member State. In other words, 
whenever a state cannot provide a treatment, EU law grants patients the right 
to obtain it in another Member State with the retention of reimbursement 
schemes in the state of insurance. Even though this dimension of market 
solidarity seems at first glance to serve as a tool for patients to achieve 
transnational access to their healthcare rights, De Witte importantly clarifies 
that, according to empirical research, this exception to the principle of 
territoriality is used by Member States, such as Malta and Luxembourg, to 
make up for the lack of specialization or financial and technological resources 
to treat rare diseases. Although very revealing, the finding that Member 
States strategically use cross-border healthcare as a tool to meet their basic 
obligations for healthcare, seems to undermine the notion of transnational 
solidarity, since it serves foremost the interests of the incapable state rather 
than those of the patient in need of the most effective treatment. 
Chapter 4 introduces the concept of communitarian solidarity as the second 
type of transnational solidarity that operates in the EU. Communitarian 
solidarity seeks to articulate the obligations of justice that follow from social 
interactions both on the European level and within the nation state, 
suggesting that co-presence of individuals alone constitutes a motive for 
sharing resources with fellow citizens. De Witte describes this type of 
solidarity as a procedural mechanism through which domestic citizenship is 
structurally opened up to include the associative social commitments that 
bind the migrant citizen to the host state polity. The illustratively presented 
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case law of the CJEU reveals that communitarian solidarity should not be 
understood as a substantive entitlement of mobile European citizens to all 
welfare benefits in the host state, but as a reflection of the social links 
between citizens. The exact nature, strength, and extent of such rights and 
entitlements depend primarily on the exact nature, strength, and extent of 
the migrant's social interactions in the host polity. In Chapter 4 the two outer 
edges of the obligation imposed on Member States under communitarian 
solidarity are discussed. The one extreme is formed by the recognition of a 
number of fundamental social rights, such as primary education, primary 
healthcare, and minimum subsistence benefits. Such rights, de Witte argues, 
can be accessed by every EU citizen, in whichever state the latter happens to 
reside. At the other extreme, the book discusses student benefits, which are 
linked to complex commitments that simultaneously reflect past, 
prospective, social, and economic commitments. 
The description of communitarian solidarity as a spectrum with two outer 
edges is a very illustrative way to depict the different commitments of EU 
Member States to solidarity. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the right to 
minimum subsistence benefits under the social rights awarded to all EU 
citizens appears quite problematic. As de Witte notes as well, the question 
whether economically inactive migrants can claim minimum subsistence 
allowance in the host state is very contentious. In Dano,9 where the CJEU had 
the chance to elaborate whether communitarian solidarity demands that 
Member States take care of all lawfully resident EU citizens in need, the 
Court argued that economically inactive EU citizens derive a right to equal 
treatment, only as long as they meet the conditions for residence in the host 
state, which include the need to have sufficient resources for themselves and 
family members not to become a burden on the welfare system of the host 
state. Since the right to social assistance benefits of EU citizens is very often 
balanced against the need to protect the general stability and availability of 
welfare resources, one might doubt whether its inclusion among the 
unconditional social rights enjoyed by EU citizens is convincing. Instead of 
describing communitarian solidarity as an obligation with two outer edges, it 
would probably be more precise to depict it as a continuum between 
unconditional enjoyment of rights and enjoyment of rights only after the 
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fulfilment of thick economic and social commitments. The different social 
rights falling under this category would then be positioned on this 
continuum, with the right to social assistance benefits falling in between the 
rights to primary healthcare and access to student benefits. 
The third type of transnational solidarity within the EU presented in Chapter 
5 is aspirational solidarity. It is the result of political interactions of EU 
citizens and imposes the negative obligation on Member States not to 
prevent their own nationals or migrant EU citizens from accessing the 
instruments that make up a 'good life', such as the labour market, public 
goods or welfare benefits. In this sense, aspirational solidarity suggests that 
being subject to EU law constitutes a motive for citizens to share resources. 
De Witte notes, however, that aspirational solidarity is the most divisive type 
of solidarity, as it has the potential to skew the redistributive preferences of 
Member States, to constrain many of the traditional instruments that 
Member States have used in order to manage their welfare models, and to pit 
the interests and aspirations of individual citizens against each other. Against 
this background, de Witte describes aspirational solidarity as a conditional 
and not absolute obligation, which is dependent on factual circumstances: 
when the aspirations of individual citizens risk undermining the 
redistributive commitments between all citizens, aspirational solidarity finds 
a limit. 
De Witte describes employment market regulation as the first way in which 
EU law checks the coercive capacity of the state in limiting the individual's 
aspirations. According to the CJEU case law presented, the Court has 
interpreted the obligations of non-discrimination – in particular on the basis 
of age – as implying that Member States may only limit access to the labour 
market in order to protect associative commitments between citizens in that 
state. In other words, workers can only be forced off the labour market if the 
Member State can demonstrate that this contributes to the capacity of all 
citizens to live a 'good life'. Building on points raised in previous chapters, de 
Witte argues that aspirational solidarity also suggests that Member States 
may not limit the individual's aspirations by making access to welfare benefits 
conditional on continuous residence in the state. By presenting relevant case 
law, he convincingly explains that citizens may export welfare benefits and 
that Member States may only limit this right when allowing export would 
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destabilize internal redistributive commitments. The last instance of 
aspirational solidarity presented in this book concerns the obligation of host 
states to extend access to public goods, such as university and hospitals, to 
mobile EU citizens. Member States are in principle required to open up their 
universities or hospitals to migrant citizens, except if allowing access to 
migrants would undermine the associative commitments entered into by 
citizens in the host state.  
In sum, the book analyses classic CJEU case law on issues of social policy 
under the innovative lens of transnational solidarity. Through this newly 
introduced concept, de Witte convincingly presents an original answer to the 
question whether the EU can contribute to the pursuit of justice and 
illustrates the various ways, in which EU law translates the associative 
commitments between citizens into norms of justice. More importantly, the 
book sketches the important role of both the Union legislator and the CJEU 
in the explicit and implicit articulation of the Union's commitment to justice. 
At the same time, an important contribution of the book is that it warns 
against the risk of EU law destabilizing rather than furthering the pursuit of 
justice in Europe. In this sense, de Witte sketches the different ways in which 
the EU institutions must be sensitive to the institutional and normative 
limits, which are inherent in EU law. In this way, the book admirably 
illuminates what it promised, namely, the added value of the EU law's focus 
on extricating the pursuit of justice from the nation state.
